From the time in June, 1861, when
he had been called upon to preside over the council of war that
decided upon the Bull Run campaign, he devoted every spare moment
to the study of such books upon the art of war as would aid him
in solving the questions that he must face as Commander-in-Chief
of the armies. With his quick mind and unusual power of logic he
made rapid progress in learning the fixed and accepted rules on
which all military writers agree. His mastery of the difficult
science became so thorough, and his understanding of military
situations so clear, that he has been called, by persons well
fitted to judge, "the ablest strategist of the war." Yet he never
thrust his knowledge upon his generals. He recognized that it was
their duty, not his, to fight the battles, and since this was so,
they ought to be allowed to fight them in their own way. He
followed their movements with keenest interest and with a most
astonishing amount of knowledge, giving a hint here, and a
suggestion there, when he felt that he properly could, but he
rarely gave a positive order.
There is not space to quote the many letters in which he showed
his military wisdom, or his kindly interest in the welfare and
success of the different generals. One of the most remarkable
must however be quoted. It is the letter he wrote to General
Joseph Hooker on placing him in command of the Army of the
Potomac in January, 1863, after McClellan's many failures had
been followed by the crushing defeat of the army under General
McClellan's successor, General Burnside, at the battle of
Fredericksburg, on December 13, 1862.
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