Pent in, as the pragmatist more than anyone else sees himself to be,
between the whole body of funded truths squeezed from the past and
the coercions of the world of sense about him, who so well as he
feels the immense pressure of objective control under which our
minds perform their operations? If anyone imagines that this law is
lax, let him keep its commandment one day, says Emerson. We have
heard much of late of the uses of the imagination in science. It is
high time to urge the use of a little imagination in philosophy. The
unwillingness of some of our critics to read any but the silliest of
possible meanings into our statements is as discreditable to their
imaginations as anything I know in recent philosophic history.
Schiller says the true is that which 'works.' Thereupon he is
treated as one who limits verification to the lowest material
utilities. Dewey says truth is what gives 'satisfaction.' He is
treated as one who believes in calling everything true which, if it
were true, would be pleasant.
Our critics certainly need more imagination of realities. I have
honestly tried to stretch my own imagination and to read the best
possible meaning into the rationalist conception, but I have to
confess that it still completely baffles me.
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