A truth must always be
preferred to a falsehood when both relate to the situation; but when
neither does, truth is as little of a duty as falsehood. If you ask
me what o'clock it is and I tell you that I live at 95 Irving
Street, my answer may indeed be true, but you don't see why it is my
duty to give it. A false address would be as much to the purpose.
With this admission that there are conditions that limit the
application of the abstract imperative, THE PRAGMATISTIC TREATMENT
OF TRUTH SWEEPS BACK UPON US IN ITS FULNESS. Our duty to agree with
reality is seen to be grounded in a perfect jungle of concrete
expediencies.
When Berkeley had explained what people meant by matter, people
thought that he denied matter's existence. When Messrs. Schiller and
Dewey now explain what people mean by truth, they are accused of
denying ITS existence. These pragmatists destroy all objective
standards, critics say, and put foolishness and wisdom on one level.
A favorite formula for describing Mr. Schiller's doctrines and mine
is that we are persons who think that by saying whatever you find it
pleasant to say and calling it truth you fulfil every pragmatistic
requirement.
I leave it to you to judge whether this be not an impudent slander.
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