The tremendous pregnancy in the way of consequences for life of this
radical difference of outlook will only become apparent in my later
lectures. I wish meanwhile to close this lecture by showing that
rationalism's sublimity does not save it from inanity.
When, namely, you ask rationalists, instead of accusing pragmatism
of desecrating the notion of truth, to define it themselves by
saying exactly what THEY understand by it, the only positive
attempts I can think of are these two:
1. "Truth is just the system of propositions which have an un-
conditional claim to be recognized as valid." [Footnote: A. E.
Taylor, Philosophical Review, vol. xiv, p. 288.]
2. Truth is a name for all those judgments which we find ourselves
under obligation to make by a kind of imperative duty. [Footnote: H.
Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntniss, chapter on 'Die
Urtheilsnothwendigkeit.']
The first thing that strikes one in such definitions is their
unutterable triviality. They are absolutely true, of course, but
absolutely insignificant until you handle them pragmatically. What
do you mean by 'claim' here, and what do you mean by 'duty'? As
summary names for the concrete reasons why thinking in true ways is
overwhelmingly expedient and good for mortal men, it is all right to
talk of claims on reality's part to be agreed with, and of
obligations on our part to agree.
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