In a third I shall
show how hard it is to discriminate subjective from objective
factors in Truth's development. You may not follow me wholly in
these lectures; and if you do, you may not wholly agree with me. But
you will, I know, regard me at least as serious, and treat my effort
with respectful consideration.
You will probably be surprised to learn, then, that Messrs.
Schiller's and Dewey's theories have suffered a hailstorm of
contempt and ridicule. All rationalism has risen against them. In
influential quarters Mr. Schiller, in particular, has been treated
like an impudent schoolboy who deserves a spanking. I should not
mention this, but for the fact that it throws so much sidelight upon
that rationalistic temper to which I have opposed the temper of
pragmatism. Pragmatism is uncomfortable away from facts. Rationalism
is comfortable only in the presence of abstractions. This pragmatist
talk about truths in the plural, about their utility and
satisfactoriness, about the success with which they 'work,' etc.,
suggests to the typical intellectualist mind a sort of coarse lame
second-rate makeshift article of truth. Such truths are not real
truth. Such tests are merely subjective. As against this, objective
truth must be something non-utilitarian, haughty, refined, remote,
august, exalted.
Pages:
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69