The balance of power had been ever
assumed as the known common law of Europe at all times and by all
powers: the question had only been (as it must happen) on the more or
less inclination of that balance.
This general balance was regarded in four principal points of view: the
GREAT MIDDLE BALANCE, which comprehended Great Britain, France, and
Spain; the BALANCE OF THE NORTH; the BALANCE, external and internal, of
GERMANY; and the BALANCE OF ITALY. In all those systems of balance,
England was the power to whose custody it was thought it might be most
safely committed.
France, as she happened to stand, secured the balance or endangered it.
Without question, she had been long the security for the balance of
Germany, and, under her auspices, the system, if not formed, had been at
least perfected. She was so in some measure with regard to Italy, more
than occasionally. She had a clear interest in the balance of the North,
and had endeavored to preserve it. But when we began to treat with the
present France, or, more properly, to prostrate ourselves to her, and to
try if we should be admitted to ransom our allies, upon a system of
mutual concession and compensation, we had not one of the usual
facilities. For, first, we had not the smallest indication of a desire
for peace on the part of the enemy, but rather the direct contrary. Men
do not make sacrifices to obtain what they do not desire: and as for the
balance of power, it was so far from being admitted by France, either on
the general system, or with regard to the particular systems that I have
mentioned, that, in the whole body of their authorized or encouraged
reports and discussions upon the theory of the diplomatic system, they
constantly rejected the very idea of the balance of power, and treated
it as the true cause of all the wars and calamities that had afflicted
Europe; and their practice was correspondent to the dogmatic positions
they had laid down.
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