The apostle must mean the same powers here he
describes in Rom. xiii, 1-3, &c., otherwise he contradicts himself,
which must not be admitted; and the powers he there speaks of, are moral
powers, i.e., such as have not only proper abilities for government and
rule, but also a right of constitution, impowering them to use their
abilities for that purpose. How can one be expected or said to be the
_minister_ of God _for good_, or a _terror to evil doers, and a praise
to them that do well_, if he is so disposed and inclined, as to love
that which is evil, and hate that which is good, and so actually is a
praise to evil doers, and a terror to such as do well? To suppose any
such thing, is to overthrow the universally established connection
between cause and effect, the means and the end. And so much (namely,
that the powers there spoken of are moral powers), _Seceders_ are forced
to grant in their explication of Rom. xiii. Say they, "The text speaks
only of powers in a moral sense." And this concession at once destroys
their scheme, and confirms what the Presbytery plead for, namely, that
none are lawful powers but such as are so according to the preceptive
will of God in his word; which certainly, in the judgment of all _who
would deal reverently with the oracles of God_, is, in this case, a rule
far preferable "to the remainders of natural light, in the moral
dictates of right reason," from which _Seceders_ fetch the institution
of this divine ordinance of magistracy, and on which they settle it, as
on (what they call) "the natural and eternal law of God;" preferring
that to the plain, perfect and complete, revelation of God's will in his
word.
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